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INTRODUCTION

Insurance coverage for punitive damages clearly undermines the
justifications for awarding punitive damages: punishment and deterrence. It allows a wrongdoer to escape what is essentially a criminal
punishment. "If punitive damages are supported by any sound policy,
that policy would appear to demand that they shall not be covered by
liability insurance."' Nevertheless, beginning in the 1970's, some
Texas appellate courts held that public policy did not preclude liability
policies from covering punitive damages. 2 Other appellate courts,
however, have reached the opposite result. 3 The Texas Supreme
Court has yet to render its opinion on the issue of whether public
policy allows liability insurance to cover punitive damages. Recent
supreme court decisions, closely related statutory enactments, and an
examination of existing appellate court decisions should result in the
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

2

(5th ed. 1984).
2. American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693
(Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref 'd n.r.e.); Dairyland County Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
3. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1990, writ denied).
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supreme court overruling decisions that have allowed insurance of punitive damages when it considers this issue.
Punitive damages have existed in English common law for more
than 200 years,4 in American jurisprudence since the 1800's,5 and in
Texas since at least 1847.6 American courts have long disputed
whether punitive damages have a place in the law. 7 This comment
avoids that battle, given that punitive damages appear firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence. 8 However, the practice of insuring against punitive damages is not as firmly grounded, thus this
comment examines the purpose of the punitive damages doctrine, and
whether that doctrine can rationally allow insurance to cover punitive
awards.
The terms "punitive" and "exemplary" are interchangeable and embrace the idea of deterrence.9 The three goals of punitive damages
are punishment, deterrence, and example. Together, these elements
satisfy the concept of punitive damages; each has the salutary effect of
fulfilling the other. If the stated purpose is to punish, the award also
deters the defendant from similar conduct in the future, and by example, deters others from such conduct. If the stated purpose is for example's sake, the award likewise punishes and deters the defendant.
If deterrence is the purpose of punitive damages, this also fulfills the
goals of punishment and example. Where insurance is not involved,
punitive damages based on a compensation rationale (allowing recovery for insult and suffering, attorneys' fees, and other remote losses)
also serve the punishment, exemplary, and deterrence purposes of the
doctrine. Thus, it is normally not critical to precisely affix one primary
purpose, or establish the independent or dependent relationships between these purposes, to have a unitary theory of punitive damages.
This comment takes the position that the modern purposes of punitive damages are punishment, example, and deterrence." ° When in4. See generally Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v. Money,
95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
5. THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 36 (3d rev. ed., N.Y., Voor-

hies 1858).
6. Graham v. Roder, 5 Tex. 141 (1849).
7. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (calling the doctrine of allowing punitive damages wrong: "It is a monstrous heresy.").
8. Forty-six states allow recovery of punitive damages. RICHARD L. BLATT ET
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE §

8.2

(1991).
9. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)(Spears, J., dissenting). "The
separate aims of punishing the tortfeasor and providing an example to deter others
are mirrored by the interchangeable use of the terms 'punitive' and 'exemplary' to
describe these damages." Id. at 477.
10. But see Flanagan v. Womack, 54 Tex. 45 (1880). Justice Bonner's dicta typifies
the school of thought that punitive damages are primarily intended as compensation

for the injured party.
Frequently the mere physical injury sustained, and which ordinarily is the
test of actual damages, would of itself be comparatively insufficient, but the
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surance enters the picture, a factor not in existence when the doctrine
developed, the punishment and recompense purposes collide. Insuring punitive damages clearly destroys all the purposes of punitive
damages except the compensation purpose. Modern courts must take
this factor into consideration in determining what purposes punitive
damages should serve today, rather than simply recite reasons given in
the past by courts that were not faced with the insurance issue.
To the extent there is a separate "recompense" justification for punitive damages, public policy supports insuring punitive damages.
This comment considers whether the recompense justification of punitive damages is sufficient to stand alone," and whether the legislature
has addressed the issue.
The comment will first define the threshold requirement of actual
knowledge of the wrong as an indicator that punitive damages are intended as punishment. Next, the comment will look at how Texas case
law has defined punitive damages to determine whether the compensation aspect of punitive damages is an independent justification such
that insuring punitive damages does not contravene public policy. The
comment will consider statutory law as a basis for finding that public
policy bars insuring punitive damages. Finally, this comment explores
how the supreme court's latest pronouncement on the purpose of punitive damages, Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel,'2 lays the
foundation for denying insurance of punitive damages.
II.

Now ASSESSED SOLEY FOR
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE BECAUSE ACTUAL
SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WRONG

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE

Is REQUIRED
Despite a split in state case law as to whether punitive damages are
insurable,' 3 the majority of U.S. cases reflect the proposition that it is
outrage upon the feelings... would be of such gross character or under such
indignant circumstances as should require ample reparation from the of-

fender .... Indulgence was extended by the courts to such verdicts, as they
tended to prevent breaches of the peace, and to encourage, by a resort to the
law of the land, the settlement of difficulties which otherwise might have
ended in personal conflicts. To this extent the public also was interested.

This indirect result to the public good, led some courts into the error of
assuming as one of the grounds why such damages should be allowed at the

suit of a private party, that it was intended as a public punishment to the
offender, thus making that an active cause which originally was but a passive
result, and in this way converting private recompense into public
punishment.
Id. at 48.
11. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). "If those are the varied purposes, then awards for punitive damages are not anchored to sound doctrinal underpinnings." Id at 479.
12. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).

13. BLA-rr, supra note 8, § 8.3.
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contrary to public policy to insure oneself against punitive damages
based on one's own conduct where state law requires a showing that
the wrongdoer was aware of the wrong.' 4 In other words, states requiring knowledge of the wrong find the purpose of punitive damages
is punishment, and those states deny insurance coverage of the damages. If the law of a particular state does not require such a finding
(and thus focuses solely on the tortfeasor's conduct, rather than
awareness), the conduct that is the basis for the punitive damage
award is virtually indistinguishable from the conduct that comprises
the underlying wrong.' 5 Without an actual knowledge requirement,
the claim is fundamentally one of negligence. Because the purpose of
awarding damages in negligence suits is compensation, a court must
find a compensatory purpose in punitive damages to justify insuring
punitive damages. Since these awards are given to make the victim
whole, it follows that insurance coverage does not subvert the purpose
of punitive damages.16 The emphasis, then, is whether a finding of
knowledge is based on an objective reasonable person standard (knew
or should have known), or whether actual subjective knowledge must
be found before awarding punitive damages. By its nature, an objective standard can serve to compensate. Such a standard would support insurance coverage of punitive damages, whereas an actual
awareness standard would not support coverage.
In the past, Texas case law allowed the jury to infer, based on an
objective standard,17 that the defendant had knowledge of the
wrong.18 One recent opinion expressed concern about defendants unwittingly crossing the "fine line" from ordinary negligence to gross
negligence, and exposing themselves to a punitive damage award because of the objective knowledge standard. 9 However, in 1987, the
Texas legislature amended the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, and raised the knowledge requirement to actual awareness.2 °
14. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4th 11, 17 (1982).
15. Id
16. Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981).
17. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
18. Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600 (1880) ("Gross
negligence, to be the ground for exemplary damages, should be that entire want of
care which would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference...."); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Shuford, 10 S.W. 408, 411 (Tex. 1888) ("Gross negligence, to be the ground for
exemplary damages, should be that entire want of care which would raise the belief
that the act.., was the result of a conscious indifference .... "); see also Burk Royalty
Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981).
19. American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693,
704 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
20. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
(3) "Exemplary damages" means any damages awarded as an example to
others, as a penalty, or by way of punishment. "Exemplary damages" includes punitive damages.
(4) "Fraud" means fraud other than constructive fraud.
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Under this analysis, an actual knowledge standard supports the rationale that punitive damages are intended to punish the tortfeasor. Consequently, it follows that to allow punitive damages to be insured
would be to defeat the purpose of punitive damages.
Specifically, there was no impetus for the legislature to change the
common law in this fashion, unless it was the intent of the legislature
to clarify who should be subjected to exemplary damage awards: only
those aware of their wrong. The logical reason for including this
awareness distinction may be that the purposes of punitive damages
are punishment and deterrence. There was no need for such a change
if the legislature intended that punitive damages also serve as compensation. A comparison of case law to Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code illustrates the legislative intent.2 '
Most early Texas cases on punitive damages involved intentional
torts with an additional element of committing the tort in a willful,
22
wanton, or reckless manner, or for fraudulent or malicious conduct.
Under the common law, fraudulent conduct justified a punitive damage award.23 Some cases required actual knowledge as an element of
(5) "Gross negligence" means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means such an entire want of care as to
establish that the act or omission was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of the person affected.
(6) "Malice" means:
(A) conduct that is specifically intended by the defendant to cause substantial injury to the claimant; or
(B) an act that is carried out by the defendant with a flagrant disregard
for the rights of others and with actual awareness on the part of the defendant that the act will, in reasonable' probability, result in human death, great
bodily harm, or property damage.
(a) Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves
that the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm with respect
to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from:
(1) fraud;
(2) malice; or
(3) gross negligence.
Id. §§ 41.001(3)-(6), .003(a).
21. Crimmins v. Lowry, 691 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1985) (legislative intent determined by examining "the old law, the evil, and the remedy") (quoting TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 6 (Vernon 1969)).
22. Shaw v. Brown, 41 Tex. 446 (1874) (sheriff adding his "commission" to the
execution of judgment was clearly unlawful); Hughes v. Brooks, 36 Tex. 379 (1872)
(attachment must be sued out maliciously to recover exemplary damages); Neil v.
Newton, 24 Tex. 202 (1859) (no exemplary damages for refusal to pay over money
collected absent aggravating circumstances of misrepresentation and deception);
Reed v. Samuels, 22 Tex. 114 (1858) (no exemplary damages for wrongful suit of attachment without malice); Cook v. De la Garza, 9 Tex. 358 (1853) (willful and wrongful ejection from one's land); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851) (malicious trespass);
Smith v. Sherwood, 2 Tex. 460 (1847) (fraudulent conduct, wanton violence, malicious
outrage justify exemplary damages).
23. Sherwood, 2 Tex. at 463.
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fraud. 24 Others held no such requirement existed. 25 Tort reform

amendments adopted in 1987 emphasize the ,actual knowledge requirement in the definitions of fraud.26 Under the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, fraud is one basis for an award of exemplary
damages. 27 Section 41.001 defines fraud as "fraud other than constructive fraud."'28 Here, the legislature adopted the common law definition of fraud, but specifically excluded constructive fraud.
Constructive fraud does not require a defendant's knowledge of the
wrongfulness of his conduct as an element of proof.29 Thus, by excluding constructive fraud, the legislature emphasized actual knowledge of the fraud as a requirement for exemplary damages.
A second way to obtain punitive damages under section 41.003 is by
showing malice in law or malice in fact. The common law defined
malice in fact (i.e., actual malice) as conduct specifically intended by
the defendant to cause substantial injury to the claimant.30 Obviously,
specific intent indicates actual awareness of the wrong. The legislature adopted this definition. 3'
While the common law defined malice in law as occurring when the
will or intent to injure could be inferred from the conduct of the
wrongdoer,32 the 1987 addition of section 41.001 raised the common
law standard to actual knowledge. Section 41.001 defines malice in
law as "an act that is carried out by the defendant with a flagrant
disregard for the rights of others and with actual awareness on the
part of the defendant that the act will, in reasonable probability, result
in human death, great bodily harm, or property damage. ' 33 The legislature apparently sought to inflict punishment only on those defendants who were morally culpable by the fact of their actual knowledge
of the wrong. Theoretically, this higher burden of proof will decrease
24. Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Contra Graves v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 161 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.
1942).
25. White v. Bond, 355 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other
grounds, 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962); Stark v. R.B. George Mach. Co., 41 S.W.2d
1023 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1931), aff'd, 73 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1934) (person
making statement is responsible for its truthfulness and speaker's knowledge of falsity
will be imputed when he makes statement without knowing whether it is false);
Klindworth v. O'Connor, 240 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
26. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
27. Id. § 41.003.
28. Id. § 41.001.
29. E.g., Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964).
30. Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969).
31. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(6)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
32. LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1991, writ
denied); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Moorhead, 405 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Schutz v. Morris, 201 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).
33. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(6)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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the number of successful punitive damage awards. Thus, had the legislature viewed punitive damages as compensatory, logic dictates it
would not have raised the burden of proof.
The same legislative focus on actual awareness is apparent in the
statutory definition of gross negligence.' The common law definition
of gross negligence, as grounds for exemplary damages, was "that entire want of care which would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. '35 Until recently, this inference of
knowledge had changed little over the years. The Texas Supreme
Court has stated,
Gross negligence, to be the ground for exemplary damages, should
be that entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act
or omission complained of was the result of a conscious indifference
to the3 6right (sic) or welfare of the person or persons to be affected
by

it.

The common law, by use of the words "raise the belief" or "raising a
presumption," used an inferred knowledge test based on an objective
standard. Thus, the common law focused on the tort itself, rather than
the actor's actual state of mind.
However, gross negligence under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code means "more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. ' 37 This wording excludes the common
law definition of negligence, which had no knowledge requirement.
Most significantly, the Code further distinguishes ordinary negligence
from gross negligence. 38 Under section 41.001, gross negligence is defined as "such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or
omission was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights,
safety, or welfare of the person affected."' 39 By adding the word "actual" to the common law definition of conscious indifference, the legislature clearly delineated when punitive damages are justified. The
standard shifted from an objective, reasonable person test to a subjective awareness test. Again, if the legislature did not intend for punitive damages to serve as punishment, there was no need to change the
common law definition.
Indeed, Senator John Montford, primary sponsor of the tort reform
bill, explained in debate that the decision to add "actual" to the common law "conscious indifference" standard was to assure that only
knowing tortfeasors would be punished."0 Adding "actual" to the def34. Id. § 41.001(5).
35. Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600 (1880).
36. Burke Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981) (citing Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Shuford, 10 S.W. 408, 411 (Tex. 1888)).
37. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
38. Id. § 41.003.
39. Id. § 41.001(5) (emphasis added).

40. Debate on Tex. S.B. 287 on the Floor of the Senate, 70th Leg. 3-9 (May 6,

1987), cited in John T. Montford & Will G. Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The
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inition of gross negligence adversely affects any compensation justification for punitive damages, as compensation then takes a
subordinate role to the punishment purpose. Raising the standard
means there will be no awards for the same conduct absent actual
knowledge. The only logical reason the legislature added an actual
awareness requirement to exemplary damage awards was because in
its view, punitive damages
are for punishment, not compensation.
After tort reform, 4 the Texas Supreme Court emphasized this subjective knowledge distinction in Moriel by comparing the statutory
definition to the common law. 42 The court held the test for gross negligence was actually two-fold: 1) whether the conduct itself created an
extreme risk, and 2) whether the defendant was actually aware of or
acted with conscious indifference to the risk.43 The court then explained that the emphasis prior courts placed on the act itself allowed
an inference of knowledge. 44 This in effect eliminated knowledge as
the distinguishing factor between a finding of negligence and gross
negligence. Thus, one can conclude under Transportation that it is
knowledge of the wrong that justifies punishment.
To summarize thus far, states without an actual awareness requirement allow insurance of punitive damages because gross negligence
becomes indistinguishable from ordinary negligence.45 If there is no
difference, then the punitive damages can be viewed as compensation,
as are actual damages. However, the Texas legislature and Texas
Supreme Court have both indicated punitive damage awards are justified only when there is actual subjective awareness of the wrong. Theoretically, then, Texas should now fall in that group of states that do
not allow insurance coverage for punitive damages. The actual knowledge requirement is the method by which the legislature distinguishes
which defendants should be punished and which should pay only actual damages to the plaintiff. Had it been the intent of the legislature
to allow punitive damages to serve as compensation, there would have
been no need to change the common law requirements. By creating a
different standard altogether, which does not focus exclusively on the
underlying tort, the legislative definition of culpable conduct supports
an underlying rationale of punishment only.

Quest for a Fairerand More Predictable Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REv. 245,
323 (1988). "MONTFORD: [W]hat we're trying to do is go back to what [exemplary
damages] was intended to be[:] ... the imposition of punishment .... ." Id.
41. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).

42. 879 S.W.2d at 19-20.
43. Id. at 23.

44. Id. at 20.
45. Rosenhouse, supra note 14.
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III.

INSURING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
THE NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES -

A.

BACKGROUND

Introduction

Although courts first justified punitive damages as compensation
and punishment, the doctrine has evolved over the past two hundred
years to one of punishment. 6 This is ,true in the common law of England, the United States, and Texas. When modern courts rely on early
cases as justification for a compensatory rationale, they ignore the
evolution of the doctrine and changes in the law of actual damages.
B.

England

Some early English cases used the term "exemplary damages" to
describe judgments designed to punish the defendant,47 while other
cases implied punitive damages also served a compensatory rationale. 8 From the beginning, there was a split in the courts as to whether
punitive damages were given for punishment, or for compensation.49
At the time, the common law allowed recovery only for actual pecuniary loss sustained. Punitive damages became a means of compensating the plaintiff since mental anguish was not an element of actual
damages.5 ° Today, mental anguish is recoverable as actual damages,
46. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, § 1.4
(2d ed. 1989).
47. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). Although the personal injury
to the plaintiff during his wrongful imprisonment was slight, the jury awarded him an
amount well in excess of his actual injury sustained. In response to a motion to set
aside the judgment as excessive, the Chief Justice stated,
[Tihe small injury done to the plaintiff... did not appear to the jury in that
striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all the King's
subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting
to destroy the liberty of the kingdom ....These are the ideas which struck
the jury on the trial; and . . .they have done right in giving exemplary
damages.
Id. at 769.
48. Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1764). The court reviewed
the plaintiff's award in light of both the actual and nonpecuniary damages he
suffered.
[Clan we say that 10001. are monstrous damages as against him, who has
granted an illegal warrant to a messenger who enters into a man's house, and
prys [sic] into all his secret and private affairs, and carries him from his house
and business, and imprisons him for six days.... [sic] Can any body say that
a guinea per diem is sufficient damages in this extraordinary case ...? We
cannot say the damages of 10001. are enormous ....
Id. at 793-94.
49. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 46, § 1.4. The authors note that "early
American cases reflected the common law confusion over the issue of whether punitive damages were penal in nature or for compensation." Id. See also Roy R. Anderson, Jr., Indemnity Against Punitive Damages:An Examination of Punitive Damages,
Their Purpose,Public Policy, and the Coverage Provisionsof the Texas StandardAutomobile Liability Insurance Policy, 27 Sw. L.J. 593, 594 (1973). To a like degree, the
same confusion has been imported into Texas common law.
50. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (Tex. 1885).
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and to the extent actual damages exist, punitive damage awards are
redundant. To a large degree, the original compensati6n justification
is no longer applicable.
Punishment eclipsed the recompense justification of punitive damages in English common law (and American common law) in the mid1800's. This was commensurate with the availability of damages for
mental anguish.51 A 1964 decision ended the confusion in the English
courts by holding that punitive damages were non-compensatory in
character.52
C. United States
The switch in American jurisprudence to a punishment rationale of
punitive damages came a hundred years earlier in Day v. Woodworth.53 Day declared that punitive damages were allowed "in view
[of] the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. '54 "By the common as well as by statute law, men
are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by
means of a civil action, and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or
punishment, given to the party injured. '55 More recently, Justice
O'Connor has
stated, "punitive damages are, by definition,
56
punishment.
Why the switch? Perhaps the judges who first considered the doctrine of punitive damages felt they needed to justify what was, under
the existing rule of actual damages, a windfall to the plaintiff.
Another explanation is that these judges realized a compensation
justification did not explain why similarly injured plaintiffs should be
compensated differently. For example, consider a scenario where two
plaintiffs, in separate accidents, sustained the same direct losses when
two different defendants ran red traffic lights and collided with the
respective plaintiffs' automobiles. The first plaintiff was injured because the defendant driver failed to notice that the traffic signal
turned red before the defendant entered the intersection. In the second accident, the defendant driver was intoxicated. The drunk driver
It may be, and is, most likely true, that the whole doctrine of punitory or
exemplary damages has its foundation in a failure to recognize as elements
upon which compensation may be given many things which ought to be
classed as injuries entitling the injured person to compensation .... At the

present time, however, the fact that it may be found difficult to ascertain the
exact amount of compensation.., is not considered ...sufficient reason why
compensation should not be given.
Id. at 353-54. See also 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 46, § 1.3(C).
51. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 46, § 1.4(A).
52. 1 All E.R. 367 (A.C. 1964).
53. 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
54. Id. at 371.

55. Id.
56. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 47 (1991)(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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defendant will most likely be found grossly negligent, and the second
plaintiff most likely will recover punitive-damages in addition to actual
damages. A compensation justification alone cannot explain why the
plaintiff injured by the drunk driver will receive more in damages than
the plaintiff injured by the sober defendant. Both plaintiffs are probably equally irritated or insulted that these thoughtless defendants
caused an accident. But is there really more injury, insult, or harm in
need of compensation because one plaintiff learned he was injured by
a drunk driver?
The difference in the awards to the hypothetical plaintiffs is clearly
justified when punitive damages are based on a punishment rationale.
The defendant charged with driving under the influence pays more
because society is punishing and deterring drunk driving, not because
one plaintiff is due more compensation than the other.
D. Texas
* Just as the common law confusion about the purpose of punitive
damages was imported into early United States common law, 57 so too
was the confusion brought into Texas. Texas cases have recognized
various purposes for punitive damages: punishment of the defendant,5 8 deterrence of the defendant, 59 deterrence of others acting in a
similar manner,' as an example to others,6 ' protection of the public
"against the violation of personal rights and social order by corporations, ' 62 to compensate "for losses too remote to be considered elements of strict compensation, 63 and reimbursement of attorney's
fees. 64 The confusion in this litany is the failure to delineate cause and
effect: punishment that justifies the award, versus the additional payments the plaintiff perceives as compensation for the loss.
Although they serve two distinct functions, actual damages and punitive damages are interrelated. The avowed purpose of actual damages is to compensate the plaintiff. Nevertheless, forcing the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff also punishes the defendant and
serves to deter similar conduct in' the future. Conversely, although the
purpose of punitive damages is punishment, these damages also compensate the plaintiff in the form of a larger award. "The point is that
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981); Graham v. Roder, 5
Tex. 141 (1849).
59. Bemal v. Seitt, 313 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1958); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851).
60. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 477 (Tex. 1984).
61. Id.; Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1985).
62. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 70 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Tex. 1934).
63. Mayer v. Duke, 10 S.W. 565, 569 (Tex. 1889). See also Bisso v. Southworth, 10
S.W. 523 (Tex. 1888); Wright Titus, Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287, 295 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1939, writ dism'd judgm't cor.).
64. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v.
Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the essential, primary objectives of punitive damages are not to fulfill
the plaintiff's need for compensation, but to fulfill the separate urposes of a quasi-criminal nature of punishment and deterrence.'
Unlike a punishment rationale, however, the compensation justification cannot independently support an award of punitive damages.
If the word "punishment" is taken out of the definition of exemplary
damages, then the award of more compensation is based on a different
level of culpability (i.e., negligence versus gross negligence, versus acting with intent). The question then becomes, why does a different
level of culpability justify more compensation? This query brings the
argument full circle to a justification of punishment, deterrence, or
example.
Nevertheless, while one line of Texas cases holds that the purposes
of punitive damages are punishment, deterrence, and example, 66 another line of cases supports the same type of award with dual purposes
of punishment and compensation.67 To justify insurance coverage of
punitive damages, there must be an independent compensatory purpose for punitive damages. If an independent compensatory purpose
can be found, then public policy permits insuring punitive damages
despite the destruction of the punitive purpose. Following is a review
of Texas cases to determine whether a separate compensation rationale can be found.
IV.

TEXAS CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT COMPENSATION AS AN
INDEPENDENT JUSTIFICATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

As previously noted, when courts allow insurance to cover a punitive damage award, they undermine the punishment justification for
those damages. The damage award does not punish the offender or
deter similar conduct in the future. In the insurance context, the issue
is whether there is a freestanding compensation justification sufficient
to support such an award. If not, the defendant should not be allowed
to avail himself of an insurance policy to escape punishment.
65. Id. See also Foster v. Bourgeois, 253 S.W. 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923),
aff'd, 259 S.W. 917 (Tex. 1924).
66. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16-17 (Tex. 1994); Cavnar v.
Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1985); Pace v. State, 650
S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. 1983); Sheffield Div. Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825,
831 (Tex. 1964); Bernal v. Seitt, 313 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. 1958); Bennett v. Howard,
170 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. 1943); Hays v. Houston & Great N.R.R., 46 Tex. 272, 27980 (1876); Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600-01 (1880);
Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S.W. 135, 138 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, judgm't adopted);
Wright Titus, Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1939, writ
dism'd judgm't cor.); Piper v. Duncan, 131 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1939, writ ref'd); Express Publishing Co. v. Hormuth, 5 S.W.2d 1025, 1026 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1928, writ ref'd); Evans v. McKay, 212 S.W. 680, 685 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1919, writ dism'd).
67. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); Flanagan v. Womack, 54 Tex.
45 (1880); Mayer v. Duke, 10 S.W. 565 (Tex. 1889); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851).
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The common threads throughout Texas case law are the punishment
and deterrence functions of punitive damages,' but the compensation
justification seems to appear and disappear as needed.69 Some courts
find the purpose of punitive damages is purely punishment.7" Others,
however, view exemplary damage awards as serving a twofold purpose: punishment to the defendant, and compensation to the plaintiff
for elements of damages considered too remote to be included in actual damages. 71
Case law does not support compensation as an "equally important"
justification for punitive damages awards. 72 A review of case law
reveals that the compensatory function, when mentioned at all, takes
a dependent role to the extent that compensation is not allowed to
interfere with the punishment function of punitive damages. The latest court ruling on punitive damages, TransportationInsurance Co. v.
Moriel,73 held that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish, and
ignored any other purpose.74 Transportationbegan its analysis of the
rationale behind punitive damages with Smith v. Sherwood,75 one of
the earliest cases in Texas jurisprudence addressing punitive damages.
Smith set out the circumstances in which punitive damages were appropriate, citing a treatise by Theodore Sedgwick 76 (frequently cited
by the supreme court in the late 1800's). In citing Sedgwick, the Smith
court stated "there is a large class of cases where the common law in
giving relief loses sight of the principle of compensation, and gives
damages by way of punishment, for acts of malice, vexation, fraud and
oppression."77 There is no reference to compensation in Smith.
Two years after Smith, Graham v. Roder78 fully discussed the purpose of punitive damages. The court held that in cases of fraud, "[tihe
measure of damages was not only compensation for the direct pecuniary loss sustained, but [also] such further vindictive or exemplary
damages by way of punishment as in the judgment of the jury the conduct of the defendant might merit. ' 79 Graham quoted a prior decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to explain: "The authorities teach
68. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 480 (Pope, J., dissenting).
69. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 594.
70. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16-17 (Tex. 1994); Smith v.
Sherwood, 2 Tex. 460 (1847).
71. Bisso v. Southworth, 10 S.W. 523 (Tex. 1888); Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Britton, 114 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 135
S.W.2d 981 (Tex. 1940).
72. Contra Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
73. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
74. Id. at 16-17.
75. 2 Tex. 460 (1847).*
76. SEDGWICK, supra note 5.
77. 2 Tex. 461 at 464 (citing THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 32
(3d rev. ed., N.Y., Voorhies 1858)) (emphasis added).
78. 5 Tex. 141 (1849).
79. Id.at 150 (emphasis added).
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that damages may be given [sic] in peculiar cases, not merely [sic] to
compensate, but to punish."8 The Graham court carefully cited to
the case law of other states that reflected a pure punishment rationale." l Like Smith, Graham also cited to Sedgwick's treatise, but more
extensively than Smith. The Graham opinion, quoting Sedgwick,
stated, "[the law] permits the jury to give what is termed punitory,
[sic] vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interests of society and the aggrieved individual, and gives
damages not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender."82 This is the most frequently cited quotation in Texas case
law on the purpose of punitive damages. Taken out of context, it does
appear to support the argument that punitive damages may be
awarded at least in part for compensation purposes. But a study of
Sedgwick's treatise reveals that he was referring to the broad topic of
damages as a whole, which includes both actual and punitive damages.
The quoted statement is thus consistent with the proposition that punitive damages are for punishment. Those who use it to justify punitive damages based on compensation use it for a proposition not
purported by Sedgwick. Sedgwick's frequent references to the punishment rationale in other sections of the treatise clearly indicate his
proposition is that punishment is the sole justification for punitive
damages.83
80. 5 Tex. at 150 (quoting McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375, 376 (Penn. 1836)).
81. E.g., Graham v. Roder, 5 Tex. 141, 150 (1849)(citing McBride v. McLaughlin, 5
Watts 375 (Penn. 1836). "[Wlhere the defendant's circumstances are brought into
account, something else than individual reparation is contemplated. Nor can it be
said the wrongdoer is to suffer in order to appease the resentment of the injured; and
that even vindicatory damages are, in truth, compensatory." McBride, 5 Watts at 376.
82. 5 Tex. at 149 (citing THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 36 (3d
rev. ed., N.Y., Voorhies, 1858)).
83. SEDGWICK, supra note 5. In Chapter 1, Sedgwick explains that damages, absent aggravating circumstances, are given to compensate the injured party. "There is,
as has already been said, a large class of cases where the common law, in getting
relief, loses sight of the principle of compensation, and gives damages by way of punishment for acts of malice, vexation, fraud, or oppression." Id. at 32 (emphasis
added).
In the next section, Sedgwick sets out the range of damages a plaintiff may incur:
actual direct pecuniary loss; indirect pecuniary loss; mental suffering; the value of time
consumed in establishing the contested right by process of law; attorneys' fees and
court costs; and the sense of wrong, or insult. Sedgwick notes that actual pecuniary
loss directly sustained and some of the actual expenses incurred in the process of law
(costs) are generally the measure of damages and are all the law will allow. Id. at 33.
Sedgwick then introduces punitive damages as additional amounts on top of the
compensation due to the plaintiff.
Thus far we have been speaking of the great class of cases where no question
of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression intervenes. Where either of
these elements mingle in the controversy, the law, instead of adhering to the
system, or even the language of compensation, adopts a wholly different
rule. It permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interest of society and of
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Nevertheless, a line of cases supporting a compensatory purpose of
punitive damages begins with Cole v. Tucker.' 4 Cole indicated that
punitive damages are given to compensate the sufferer as well as punish the offender."5 The Cole court, obviously paraphrasing Sedgwick,
stated: "When the ordinary rules of compensation are dispensed with
the damages may be denominated exemplary, for the reason that if
high they deter from the commission of similar offenses; but they also
effect the purpose of compensation. . . ."I Thus, the Cole court implied that a higher level of culpability on the part of the defendant
determines which plaintiffs recover more for the same or similar injuries. Cole overlooked the fact that in this instance, it is not the plaintiff who should be rewarded, but rather it is the tortfeasor's
aggravated conduct that justifies punishment.
South Texas Coaches, Inc. v. Eastland 7 better explained Sedgwick's
famous quotation, indicating "[e]xemplary damages... necessarily involves [sic] a blending of the general interest of society with those
peculiar to the aggrieved party.""8 Society's main interests are punishment and deterrence. The plaintiff's primary interest, on the other
hand, is to recover more money. The court in Cole appeared to confuse the cause and effect relationship between punishment and the
the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to recompense the sufferer but to punish the offender.
Id. at 36.
In this context, the concept "not only to recompense the sufferer" refers to the
actual damages awarded. The introduction of the aggravating circumstances justifies
a larger award "to punish the offender." The reference to recompense pertains to all
damages, not merely punitive damages. Beyond these introductory remarks, Chapter
18 specifically discusses why punitive damages are allowed.
And I have stated the rule to be, that where gross fraud, malice, or oppression appears, the jury are not bound to adhere to the strict line of compensation, but may, by a severer verdict, at once impose a punishment on the
defendant and hold up an example to the community.
Id. at 477.
Sedgwick further reiterates, "but it will appear from the cases we now proceed to
examine, that the idea of compensation is abandoned and that of punishment is introduced." Id. at 482. From a reading of the treatise as a whole, it appears Sedgwick
espoused nothing more than a punishment justification for punitive damages. ComGERALD W. BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW, § 1:9
(1993) (referring to the debate between Professor Greenleaf and Theodore
Sedgwick). While Professor Greenleaf "endeavored to explain judgments that ostensibly included punitive damages as in reality no more than full compensation for the
plaintiff's injury," Sedgwick's theory that punitive damages were allowed for example
and punishment prevailed. Id. See also 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 46,

mentators agree. See

§ 1.4.
84. 6 Tex. 266 (1851).
85. Id. The petitioner/appellant sought to have the punitive damage award vacated because he was subject to a contingent criminal fine arising out of the same
behavior. The court stated, "this is not sufficient to relieve him from exemplary damages in a civil action should the facts justify such damages." Id. at 271.
86. Id. at 271.
87. 101 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, no writ).
88. Id. at 883 (emphasis added)(quoting 17 C.J. Damages § 268 (1919)).
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fact the plaintiff keeps the award. s9 Furthermore, the compensatory
rationale supporting punitive damages in Cole was obviously absent in
Flanagan v. Womack.9"
In Flanagan,the issue was whether a criminal fine assessed for the
same act prosecuted in a subsequent civil trial was relevant to the
jury's consideration of the appropriate amount of punitive damages.
The Flanagancourt noted: "[T]hat exemplary damages are in the nature of punishment, has long been the recognized doctrine in this
state." 91 The court concluded "[i]f exemplary damages are allowed as
punishment and not strictly as compensation, then all the facts and
circumstances of the case which would enable the jury to act advisedly
in inflicting the appropriate punishment, would be proper for their
consideration." 92 The court allowed evidence of the criminal fine in
the civil trial. Thus, Flanagan denied a compensation justification for
punitive damages. The Flanagancourt also refuted compensation was
an equally important consideration for punitive damages, a proposition Hofer v. Lavender93 later implied in its reading of Cole.
Another situation in which the Texas Supreme Court has emphasized punishment rather than compensation to support an award of
punitive damages has been by limiting the doctrine of respondeatsuperior. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell 94 stands for the proposition that punishment is the justification for punitive damages.
Implicitly, the court found that the compensatory purpose, if it existed
at all, was subordinate to and would not be allowed to thwart the
punishment rationale. Fort Worth Elevators considered whether a corporation was liable for punitive damages assessed against the corporation's employees under a respondeatsuperiortheory. The court held
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior did not extend liability to the corporation for punitive damages (unlike compensatory damages) absent
a finding the principal adopted, ratified, or directed the agent's acwhere there was a lack of supervision that allowed the tort to
tions, or
95
occur.

In reviewing rules of other states, the court noted that the jurisdictions which made no exceptions to vicarious corporate liability for punitive damages refrained because "[it] seems to be an outgrowth of
the original conception of the purpose of exemplary damages, that is,
compensation.., for the injured party rather than as a punishment for
the offender." 96 Fort Worth Elevators rejected this theory, ruling in89. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
90. 54 Tex. 45 (1880).
91. Id. at 50 (quoting Hays v. Houston & Great N.R.R., 46 Tex. 272, 280 (1876)).
92. Id.
93. 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984).
94. 70 S.W.2d 397, 409 (Tex. 1934).
95. Id. at 406. See also Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Hays
v. Houston & Great N.R.R., 46 Tex. 272 (1876).
96. Fort Worth Elevators, 70 S.W.2d at 403.
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stead that the acts which were the basis for a punitive damage award
must have been those of the offending corporation, and not merely
those of the agent. The corporation was not liable for punitive damages caused by the acts of the agent unless it could be shown that the
employee's specific behavior was at the direction of the corporation.
Thus, Fort Worth Elevators rejected a compensation purpose for punitive damages. If the compensatory aspect of punitive damages was
independent of the punishment purpose, the court would have allowed the plaintiff to reach the deep pockets of the employer by not
limiting the respondeatsuperior doctrine.
Similarly, punitive damages have been limited against municipalities, at the expense of a compensation theory, because of concern for
the punishment aspect of punitive damages. A municipality is not vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed against its employee unless the employee's "conduct can be imputed directly to the governing
body of the municipality."97 While a corporation may be liable for
punitive damages when any level of management directs the employee's acts,98 a municipality is liable only when it can be shown the
agent's acts were "expressly authorized by the municipal government
or that they were done 'bona fide in pursuance of general authority to
act for the municipality on the subject to which they relate.' "99 The
rule for municipalities is more narrowly drawn than the rule for corporations because the financial burden of the judgment award falls on
taxpayers. Nevertheless, an award of exemplary damages serves the
punishment and deterrent objectives in the municipal setting because
it is a wake-up call to city officials to examine policies that led to the
damage award. Furthermore, because the award punishes the taxpayer, the political process brings pressure to bear on the situation to
assure similar behavior is avoided in the future. Like the rule for corporations, if compensation had been controlling in the circumstance,
respondeatsuperiorwould have allowed recovery of punitive damages
resulting from employee activities that occurred in the course and
scope of employment. Here again is another example where the court
has subordinated the compensation justification for punitive damages.
Lunsford v. Morris' placed special emphasis on the punishment
role of punitive damages. Lunsford held that the defendant's net
worth was discoverable because "[t]hat which could be an enormous
penalty to one may be but a mere annoyance to another."'' This
reflects the further refinement of a doctrine directed at punishment.
The court did not discuss punishment versus compensation, but indi97. City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 522 (Tex. 1987).
98. Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
99. City of Gladewater,727 S.W.2d at 523 (quoting Christopher v. City of El Paso,
98 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, writ dism'd)).
100. 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1988).
101. Id. at 472.
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cated that in determining the amount of punitive damages, compensation was again subordinate. If compensation was a concern in
awarding punitive damages, defendant wealth would be immaterial, as
it is in actual damages.
The most extensive discussions of the purpose of punitive damages
are the majority and dissenting opinions in Hofer v. Lavender.10 2 In a
five-four decision, the court held that under the Texas Survival Statute, 10 3 punitive damages could be assessed against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.' ° The defendant in Hofer died of unrelated causes
before the case came to trial. The defendant was found grossly negligent.'0 5 The question in Hofer was whether the word "damages" in
the Texas Survival Statute included exemplary damages. The court, in
reviewing the law of other jurisdictions, determined that if the purpose of exemplary damages was solely to punish or deter, then "damages" under the Survival Statute did not include exemplary
damages.' 0 6 Hofer found that Texas case law recognized the purposes
of punitive damages are three-fold: 1) for punishment, 2) as an example to others, and 3) for compensation, that is, for reimbursement of
losses such as inconvenience and attorney fees that are too remote to
be considered elements of strict compensation. 0 7 The court determined, punishment aside, the other purposes of punitive damages
were "equally important considerations" for allowing punitive
damages. 108
If the court had specified which purpose was to be served in allowing the Hofers to recover punitive damages, the analysis in this
case would be easier. Clearly, with the death of the wrongdoer, there
is no punishment or deterrence of the tortfeasor to be served. It does
not deter or serve as an example to other dead tortfeasors. The court
does not make clear in the opinion whether it believes the purposes of
deterrence or example would affect the behavior of potential
tortfeasors. If the award was given as deterrence or to serve as an
example to others, then the compensation issue was not determinative, and the award would be justified. But the threat of an award
against one's estate does not seem to be much of a threat at all. Thus
it seems likely there was nothing more than a compensation function
102. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
103. Act of May 4, 1895, 24th Leg., R.S., ch. 89 § 1, 1895 Tex. Gen. Laws 143, repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws
3322 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (Vernon Supp.
1995)).
104. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 475.
105. Id. at 471. The defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the accident
was .27. Id.
106. Id. at 473-74.
107. Id. at 474.
108. Id. at 475.
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served in the case. If so, the court in effect found that compensation
was an independent reason for the 'award. of punitive damages.
To find that compensation was an independent justification of punitive damages amounts to an unjustified extension of the doctrine. The
court's misconception of authority for the proposition can be blamed
on its reliance upon Cole,10 9 in confusing cause and effect, 10 as well as
failing to recognize that Flanaganv. Womack"' had limited Cole. The
dissent in Hofer pointed out that when the punishment, deterrence
and exemplary goals were stripped away from the punitive damages
doctrine, all that remains is another category of compensatory damages. 112 Ultimately, there is no reason to allow similarly situated
plaintiffs to recover different amounts of compensation without reference to punishment or deterrence. 1 3 Similarly, the court's reliance on
Mayer v. Duke" 4 and Allison v. Simmons" 5 runs into similar
problems. Both of these cases fail to distinguish between why the
damages were awarded and what the measure of damages is. The
"why" (i.e., the justification) was punishment. The "what" was recovery of remote losses, inconvenience, or attorneys'
fees. Again, there is
1 6
a court's confusion between cause and effect.
A clear distinction of "why" and "what" (or the cause and effect of
punitive damages) is made in the Pattern Jury Charges. The State Bar
of Texas Pattern Jury Charge for exemplary damages plainly states
why punitive damages are assessed: "'Exemplary damages' means an
amount that you may in your discretion award as an example to others
and as a penalty or by way of punishment, in addition to any amount
that you may have found as actual damages."17 The jury charge demonstrates the difference between the cause (the fact that the damages
are motivated by punishment) and effect (the jury can base the award
on anything). The plaintiff can show evidence of other remote losses,
attorney's fees, or defendant wealth to guide the jury award. But the
basic distinction is still between why punitive damages are assessedpunishment; and what the award includes-the measure of damages.
Hofer v. Lavender" 8 is better justified as an exception to the punishment rationale. Basing a punitive damage claim on whether the
109. 6 Tex. at 271 (holding that criminal punishment or the potential thereof does
not relieve defendant from exemplary damages in civil action).
110. Supra note 49 and accompanying text.
111. 54 Tex. 45 (1880).
112. 679 S.W.2d at 479 (Pope, C.J., dissenting on motion for rehearing).
113. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
114. 10 S.W. 565 (Tex. 1889).
115. 306 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
117. 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PAl-rERN JURY CHARGES, PJC 7.06 and comment (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989). This pattern jury charge is essentially the same
charge always given by the court. E.g., Jones v. Matthews, 12 S.W. 823 (Tex. 1889);
Carrington Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
118. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
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tortfeasor survives puts an untenable burden on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff will not know if he has a maintainable cause of action until
judgment is rendered. Without such an exception, the plaintiff could
lose his cause of action years later if the defendant died before judgment. Viewed as a necessary exception, the rule removes uncertainty.
Following Hofer, the supreme court again considered punitive damages in Cavnar v. Quality ControlParking,Inc." 9 In Cavnar,the issue
was whether prejudgment interest was available for actual and punitive damages. The court clearly distinguished between punitive and
actual damages by noting that punitive damages are for punishment,
and actual damages are for compensation. Concerning actual damages, the court stated, "if a judgment provides plaintiffs only the
amount of damages sustained at the time of the incident, plaintiffs are
not fully compensated." 120 Thus, a defendant "ought not to be able to
use someone else's money as it pleases ... thereby enjoying a very
considerable benefit, and then pay nothing for the use of the
money.' 12 ' The court held that in order to fully compensate the plaintiff, prejudgment interest accrues in personal injury cases and survival
However, Cavnardenied
actions six months after the event occurs.' 22 23
damages.'
punitive
for
interest
prejudgment
If the court had believed a compensation purpose existed for punitive damages, it would have included prejudgment interest on the punitive damages. Since the court reasoned that punitive damages are
inflicted as punishment, it held prejudgment interest was not needed
to make the plaintiff whole.' 24 Thus, Cavnar implicitly denied any
compensatory purpose for punitive damages.
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls' 25 is cited primarily for its definition of
the gross negligence standard. However, it also refers to the penal
damages, without citing a compensatory
nature of exemplary
26
justification.'
The latest discussion on the purpose of punitive damages is found in
TransportationInsurance Co. v. Moriel.127 The Transportationopinion
put to rest the theory that punitive damages are to compensate for
remote losses. The court found actual damages compensate the
119. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
120. d at 552.
121. Id. at 552 n.1 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569
S.W.2d 480,485 (Tex. 1978) (citing 1975 case involving Phillips Petroleum Co. decided
under similar facts)).
122. Id. at 555.
123. Id. This ruling was adopted by the legislature: "Prejudgment interest may not
be assessed or recovered on an award of exemplary damages." TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN.

124.
125.
126.
127.

§ 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1994).

696 S.W.2d at 555.
616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
Id.
879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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plaintiff, and punitive damages punish the defendant.' 28 In this opinion, there was no overlap of actual and punitive damages. Further, in
precisely outlining the purpose of punitive damages, Transportation
made an argument that would destroy itself if recompense was read
into the meaning.
Transportation drew a bright line delineation regarding the nature
of punitive damages by first contrasting them with compensatory damages. The court stated that money damages were justified as compensation to the injured plaintiff, to make the plaintiff whole, but punitive
damages had an altogether different purpose.129 The Transportation
court indicated that punitive damages were assessed as punishment
for quasi-criminal or morally criminal conduct. 30 The court recognized a "close connection" between punitive damages and the criminal law.' The legal justification is quasi-criminal only because the
damages are assessed in a civil court. Thus, the purpose of punitive
damages is the same as a penalty assessed in a criminal court. The
Texas Criminal Code acknowledges punishment and deterrence as the
purposes of the Criminal Code. 32 This admits no compensatory purpose of punitive damages.
The Transportation opinion, in setting out the purposes of punitive
damages as punishment and deterrence, denied that punitive damages
compensate by explaining why a plaintiff is allowed to keep a punitive
damage award: The award is simply a windfall to the plaintiff. 133 The
opinion avoided the confusion of cause and effect found in other opinions that tried to justify the plaintiff's retention of the award by calling it compensation. If the effect of the "windfall" is to cover
attorney's fees, etc., then so be it. The Transportationmajority made a
clear delineation that effectively negates the compensatory theory
used to justify punitive damages in Texas. Thus, Transportation appears to overrule any compensation purposes for punitive damage
awards.
V.

TEXAS COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER
STATUTES AND CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION

The Texas Supreme Court has not yet considered whether public
policy allows insurance to cover punitive damages. In Texas, the issue
was first considered in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wallgren.3 Using essentially a contract construction analysis, the
court explained in a two-page opinion that public policy did not pre128. Id. at 16-17.
129. Id. at 16.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 16-17.
132. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon 1994).
133. 879 S.W.2d at 17.
134. 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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clude insuring punitive damages. 135 The Dairyland court reasoned
that public policy could be found in the state's statutes, as enlarged
upon by state administrative agencies.' 36 In this case, the sole statute
under consideration was the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act. 137 The Insurance Commission prescribes policy wording, pursuant to its legislatively delegated authority. 138 The Dairyland court
held that the policy wording was expansive enough to include punitive
damages, and thus public policy did not preclude insuring punitive
damages.' 39 The case was wrongly decided under the pretence that
public policy had addressed this issue. In reality, the opinion sidestepped a discussion of the purposes of punitive damages, an essential
element in defining the words of the automobile liability policy. The
court could have reached a different result had it considered current
case law relating to the purposes of punitive damages. With the benefit of subsequent decisions and legislative enactments, it is likely a
court deciding this case today would find that public policy precludes
insuring punitive damages.
There are several reasons why the court erred in finding coverage
for punitive damages in the contract wording. First, the personal auto
policy under consideration read: "To pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as dam"140 The Dairylandcourt focused
ages because of... bodily injury ....

on the phrase "all sums" rather than looking at the restrictor "bodily
injury." The words "all sums because of bodily injury" are not ambiguous. Punitive damages are not awarded because of bodily injury, but
for punishment due to the defendant's gross negligence, which requires an awareness of his wrong.' 4 ' Under this analysis, other courts
have found punitive damages are not covered by the policy.' 42
Secondly, it is doubtful that the legislature at that time considered
the phrase "bodily injury" to mean anything other than actual damages. In 1951, there had been no court cases considering punitive
damages with which the legislature might have been concerned and
135. lIdat 343. See also Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(holding an automobile uninsured
motorist coverage with substantially the same insuring agreement as found in the
Dairylandliability policy provided coverage for punitive damage awards against an
uninsured motorist). The opinion follows the Dairyland analysis.
136. 477 S.W.2d at 342.
137. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon Supp. 1995).
138. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5.06, 5.35 (Vernon Supp. 1994).

139. 477 S.W.2d at 342.
140. Id. at 343. The Insurance Commission drew the prescribed words of the insuring agreement from the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon Supp. 1995).
141. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 615.
142. Cf.Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-El
Paso, 1990, no writ) (punitive damages not covered under an almost identical insuring
agreement for uninsured motorist). See also Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 18 A.2d
357 (Conn. 1941); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1934).
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desired to legislatively overrule. Most likely, the legislature's intent
was to cover the vast majority of cases where citizens were unable 1to
43
recover any actual damages because the wrongdoer was uninsured.
Third, the court should have given meaning to the words "all sums
as a result of bodily injury" by analyzing the words in light of Texas
case law available at that time relating to punitive damages.'" Had
the court done this, it most likely would have concluded that punitive
damages served as punishment to the tortfeasor, and thus allowing
insurance to cover the damages
would destroy the very purpose of
145
awarding punitive damages.

The Dairyland court did not have the benefit of the Deceptive

Trade Practices Act 14 6 ("DTPA") as a legislative reflection

47

that pu-

nitive damages are assessed for a punishment purpose. The DTPA is
relevant because it offers insight into the legislature's intent: Punitive
damages are awarded as punishment, not compensation. The DTPA
does not expressly state treble damages are punishment, but it appears
clear the legislature was contemplating punishment when the Act was
passed.
Section 17.44 of the DTPA indicates the statute's purpose is to protect consumers and to provide efficient and economical procedures to
secure such protection. The Act accomplishes this by providing a statutory cause of action 148 to plaintiffs who would otherwise be subjected
to the onerous burden of proof and numerous defenses encountered
in common law fraud or breach of warranty actions. 49 Section
17.50(b)(1) allows "the amount of actual damages found by the trier
of fact" and directs the court to "award two times that portion of the
actual damages that does not exceed [one thousand dollars] $1,000."
This section does not require awareness of wrongdoing on the part of
the tortfeasor, only a finding that the specific act occurred. Including
attorney's fees'5 0 gives meaning to the Act since many condemnable
actions would otherwise escape punishment because it was not economically feasible to pursue them. In this aspect, allowing an award
of attorneys' fees and trebling of a modest amount of actual damages
(up to $1,000) encourages citizens to function as private attorney
143. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

144. See supra notes 68-133 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
147. Pace v. State, 650 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1983). "[Tlreble damages under the DTPA
are punitive damages. Punitive damages ... punish the wrongdoer and are an example to others." Id. at 65.
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987). The DTPA creates a
cause of action when specified acts such as the following are committed: (1) false,
misleading, or deceptive acts; (2) breach of express or implied warranty; (3) unconscionable acts or courses of action; and (4) any act in violation of Article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code. See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21 § 1 (Vernon 1981).
149. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980).
150. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987).
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generals and help prevent the condemned behavior. The legislature
accomplishes this by creating economics that encourage suits in
smaller claims. It is difficult to imagine in such limited actual damage
claims that the plaintiff suffered any "remote loss" worthy of compensation in the form of punitive damages. Therefore, it appears likely
that compensation had little to do with adopting this part of the Act.
This leaves only punishment and deterrence as reasons for the damage
award.
Damage awards under the DTPA for knowingly committing the
proscribed acts come closer to reflecting the common law of punitive
damages. Actual damages above $1,000 may be trebled (at the discretion of the trier of fact) only if committed knowingly. "Knowingly" is
defined as "actual knowledge of the wrong.'' 1 5 Here again, it appears
the addition of "knowingly" as a required finding is to determine who
should be punished. It is incorrect to say that the defendant's state of
mind determines which plaintiffs are compensated. Rather, the defendant's state of mind determines which defendants are punished.
This is because it is inconsistent to label punitive damages as compensation while limiting recovery among plaintiffs with similar injuries. If
compensation were a controlling factor, then the defendant's awareness would not limit the award. Thus, the legislature appears to have
included the knowledge requirement in the DTPA with punishment in
mind rather than compensation.
Nor did the Dairyland court have the benefit of the legislature's
addition of Chapter 41, Exemplary Damages, to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.' 52 The Act indicates the legislature's intent
to impose exemplary damages as punishment because it states that
punitive damages are assessed against only those defendants with actual subjective awareness of their wrong. The Act specifically defines
the three reasons exemplary damages are awarded: example, punishment, and penalty.' 53 Allowing insurance of punitive damages would
be contrary to the statute, by effectively undercutting each of the statutory justifications for punitive damage awards.' 5 4 This is why the
definition "exemplary damages includes punitive damages ' 15 does
not import the compensation rationale found in the common law. Importing a compensation purpose would destroy the legislative pur151. Id. § 17.45(9).
152. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001-.009 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
153. Id. § 41.001(3) (" 'Exemplary damages' means any damages awarded as an example to others, as a penalty, or by way of punishment."). The statutory definition of
exemplary damages closely parallels the Texas pattern jury charge, long used in some
form. The pattern jury charge provides: "'Exemplary damages' means an amount
that you may in your discretion award as an example to others and as a penalty or by
way of punishment, in addition to any amount that you may have found as actual
damages." 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 7.06 (2d ed.
1987 & Supp. 1989).
154. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
155. Id.
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poses of example, penalty, and punishment if insurance was allowed
to cover punitive damage awards.
The statutory definition of exemplary damages clarifies the common law confusion on the purposes of punitive damages. The Act
does what many judicial decisions failed to do in the past: delineate,
vis-a-vis the elements of exemplary damages (which may include
plaintiff's remote losses), exactly why the damages are awarded.
Based upon this unambiguous language, which clearly spells out that
exemplary damages are for punishment and deterrence, it is contrary
to legislative intent to allow wrongdoers to escape punishment by insuring the awards against them.
A result consistent with the new statutory definition of exemplary
damages was reached in Government Employees Insurance Co. v.
Lichte.15 6 In Government Employees, the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that the uninsured motorist provisions of the personal automobile policy did not cover exemplary damage awards. 157 Similar to the
liability insuring agreement in Dairyland,158 the uninsured motorist
provision considered by Government Employees was prescribed by the
Insurance Commission. 159 The wording of the uninsured motorist
provision was nearly identical to the liability insuring agreement considered in Dairyland. The uninsured motorist provision provided coverage for damages sustained by the insured as a result of bodily injury
caused by an uninsured motorist. 16 The El Paso Court of Appeals
held: "[Djamages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover
from an uninsured motorist because of bodily injury incurred does not
include coverage for an award of exemplary damages.''I Relying
upon Cavnar,162 the court stated: "The purpose of allowing the recovery of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer.' 1 63 Since the
purpose of punitive damages is punishment, public policy should not
allow punitive damages to be insured.
VI.

OTHER PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF INSURING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In one case, a product liability policy contained a provision stating,
"The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
156. 792 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1990, writ denied).
157. Id. at 549.

158. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5.06, 5.35 (Vernon Supp. 1994).

160. Government Employees, 792 S.W.2d at 549.
161. Id.
162. 696 S.W.2d at 549.
163. Government Employees, 792 S.W.2d at 549 (citing Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555-56 (Tex. 1985)).
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bodily injury .
,,.64 The court held the contract language included
punitive damages. American Home is interesting because the opinion
correctly stated that the purposes of punitive damages are punishment
and deterrence, but then tried to find a way to allow coverage for
punitive damages without sacrificing the punishment and deterrence
goals. 165 Consequently, the path American Home took to reach its
conclusion is questionable.
The court first found that the policy language was ambiguous, and
thus there would be coverage for punitive damages under the contract
unless the public policy prohibited such coverage. 166 The court rejected the argument that gross negligence is the equivalent of intent to
cause harm and thus excluded under the policy. 167 The usual definition of an "occurrence" insured under a liability policy is "an event
that ...[is] 'neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of by
the insured.' ",168 With the emphasis on creation of an extreme risk
under Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 169 the American Home court did not
have to find actual knowledge of the wrong. Thus, it would have been
a stretch to exclude coverage because "intent" under an objective
standard is not equal to actual awareness. Consequently, it was reasonable to include coverage on this basis.
However, the analysis would have been different using the rationale
later espoused by Moriel. Moriel's requirement of actual subjective
awareness 170 strongly suggests that the policy exclusion for acts intended or expected by the insured is applicable to exclude punitive
damage awards under a policy. An actual knowledge finding would
mean the insured either intended to cause harm or was aware his act
would likely cause harm, and then proceeded with conscious indifference as to the risk. 17' Thus, the exclusion for intentional acts of the
insured is now directly on point as to why a policy should not cover
punitive damages.
American Home sidestepped the above argument as "technical
analysis," finding instead that to deny coverage for punitive damages
was against the expectations of the average policyholder. 72 The opinion does not explain why policyholder expectations should trump public policy on punitive damages. This would be analogous to enforcing
an illegal contract because of the parties' expectations.
164. American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693,
696 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
165. Id. at 704.
166. Id. at 701-02.

167. Id. at 701.
168. Id.
169. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
170. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).

171. Id.
172. 743 S.W.2d at 701-02.
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The American Home court was concerned that a business guilty of
only simple negligence might still be liable for punitive damages because of an unclear threshold of gross negligence. A sympathetic jury
might find punitive damages when in fact the conduct was not grossly
negligent. "A fine line separates conduct that justifies imposition of
punitive damages from conduct that does not."' 7 3 "After Burk Royalty, the ability of a plaintiff to allege and obtain a punitive damage
award has undoubtedly been enhanced. As a consequence, business
and professional persons, firms and corporations constantly face the
risk that where gross negligence is alleged, a verdict for punitive damages might well follow."'1 74 Burk Royalty focused on the extreme risk
created and allowed for an inference of conscious indifference to find
gross negligence.'" The burden on the plaintiff to prove gross negligence has been increased by the decision in Moriel.'76 Where Burk
Royalty allowed an inference of conscious indifference, Moriel required a finding of actual conscious indifference before the conduct
was considered gross negligence. 177 The "fine line" that separated
negligence and gross negligence-a matter of paramount importance
to the American Home court-has been changed to a bright line distinction by Moriel. Thus, the concern over an indefinite standard of
gross negligence is no longer useful to justify insurance for punitive
damages.
Second, the American Home court was concerned that denying insurance coverage for punitive damages against a business might result
in "permanent financial collapse,"' 178 that is, a sort of quasi-criminal
death penalty. Since the defendant's net worth is now discoverable, 79
a jury can consider the financial impact of punitive awards. If the
award is so large as to drive the corporation out of business, then it
can only be a reflection that society simply does not want this corporation to continue operating. Thus, American Home's concern over financially disastrous awards 180 also appears to be negated.
Third, the American Home court expressed concern that a corporation might be penalized for an isolated act of one of its employees.
The court implied that neither the punishment purpose nor the deterrence rationale is served when the punitive award against a business is
based on an anomalous employee act. The American Home court ignored standing case law which limits vicarious liability of corporations
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 704.
Id.
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 915, 922 (Tex. 1981).
879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
Id. at 23.
743 S.W.2d at 704.
Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1988).
743 S.W.2d at 704.
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for the acts of agents and employees.'81 Thus, this also fails as a valid
argument.
American Home made several arguments about the incidence of punitive damages. The court addressed the public policy argument of
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty. 112 In McNulty, the

court stated that allowing insurance of punitive damages meant that
the insurance company was punished instead of the wrongdoer, and
ultimately policyholders were punished in the form of higher premiums. 1 83 American Home, responding to McNulty, pointed out that allowing punitive damages to be insured was hardly punishing the
insurance company that agreed to insure the offending business
against such claims. 184 The argument is well taken, but misses the
point. The issue remains as to whether the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant.
It may very well be profitable for an insurance company to cover
punitive damages. 185 Since a company's premium rates are based on
losses paid, increases in losses paid will justify a rate hike approval by
the Texas Department of Insurance. An insurance company is similar
to a clearinghouse. Premium dollars flow in the front door. Profits
and operating expenses are removed. Any remaining dollars flow out
the back door in the form of claim payments. 86 The increase in rates
to cover punitive damages means more dollars flow in the front door,
resulting in more dollar profits taken out (given a constant profit margin).187 Thus, the issue does not turn on whether insurance companies
should be let off the hook by denying coverage of punitive damages.
But to the extent the coverage is profitable, it is in the insurance companies' best interest to cover punitive damages.
Alternatively, to the extent punitive damages awards are unpredictable, insurance companies may withdraw from the market in Texas
when faced with excessive losses. This in turn leads to fewer choices
for the consumer, and eventually higher premiums."8 Additionally,
181. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
182. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).

183. Id. at 440-441.
184. 743 S.W.2d at 704.
185. To the extent the aggregate losses and costs are predictable, accompanied by
adequate rates, punitive damage insurance could be profitable. See generally ROBERT
I.

MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 32-37 (6th ed. 1976).
186. See DAVID L. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 33-38 (10th ed. 1979).
187. This analysis assumes that the aggregate punitive damage awards are predictable. Insurance companies base premium calculations on the law of large numbers.
This means that while any particular award may not be predictable, the aggregate of
punitive damage awards in a given state is predictable because it is proportionately
tied to the number of policies issued in a given line of insurance and/or premiums
received for that line of coverage. Thus, where punitive damages are predictable, the
insurance company profits increase. See id.; see also MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note
185 at 32-37.
188. This is part of the classic underwriting cycle.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol2/iss1/10
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V2.I1.8

28

McKay: Texas Public Policy on Insuring Punitive Damages: Time for a Fres

19951

INSURING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

an individual with a past conviction for DUI may be unable to obtain
automobile insurance coverage at any price because insurance companies may not be willing to risk a potential punitive damage award.
An increase in premiums would mean society would be paying for
the punishment of the wrongdoer, and thus the punishment and deterrence justifications would both be thwarted. While policyholders
would likely agree with the need for coverage for compensatory damages due to simple negligence, it is highly unlikely that many drivers
would understand why they had to pay additional premiums to cover
punitive damage awards against tortfeasors such as drunk drivers. As
Judge Wisdom stated, "it is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against
'
the civil punishment that punitive damages represent." 189
Since puni19°
tive damages are quasi-criminal in nature,
society should not be
forced to pay the penalty for that punishment.
Insuring punitive damages has a far-reaching impact on the economic business climate of the state. In addition to forcing businesses
to pay higher premiums for the grossly negligent acts of a competitor,
this practice may also cause companies considering a relocation to select another state besides Texas.
Moreover, established companies might move out of state to escape
escalating premium costs. The stage is set for an overhaul of the system similar to the recent worker's compensation law reform. That reform was driven by the old law's negative 'effects on the Texas
economy, where worker's compensation premiums had significantly
increased the cost of doing business in Texas. To the extent that premiums in Texas rise because of punitive damages coverage, corporations are discouraged from doing business in Texas, and jobs are lost.
American Home indicated, "[a corporation's] inability to obtain
such coverage [for punitive damages] will inevitably be passed on to
the consumers of its products." 91 It is true the corporation has only
income from customers to pay its expenses. But where punishment is
concerned, the American Home court's statement is not accurate.
Their premise was based on the faulty assumption that retail demand
is inelastic, meaning the demand for goods and services of a particular
company remain constant although it increases prices. 92 In a competitive market, a company cannot automatically increase its product
price to absorb a punitive damage award. If it does so, customers will
seek other suppliers. If there is no coverage for punitive damage
awards, the corporate wrongdoer is punished because the cost of the
189. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
190. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994).
191. 743 S.W.2d at 704.
192. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS, 84-88 (6th ed.
1989).
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award must be paid out of existing profits. Even if prices are raised as
demand increases, the corporate offender is still punished because its
profit margin is comparatively less than its competitors. Therefore,
where no insurance is available for punitive damages, the punishment
purpose is fulfilled because the cost cannot be passed on automatically. Hence, it would be more accurate to state the opposite of the
American Home proposition: If punitive damages are insured, the cost
will inevitably be passed on to consumers. Insuring punitive damage
awards will result in higher fixed costs (due to increased premiums)
borne by corporations across the board, making it easier for the market to increase consumer prices since corporations operate under similar fixed costs.
American Home attempted to reconcile how insuring punitive damages did not destroy the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive damages. The court asserted these goals were still served because
of the threat that a punitive damage award may exceed insurance coverage, or that the company will be forced to pay increased premiums
in the future. 193
First, the more likely effect is that corporate risk managers will simply select higher liability policy limits to cover a worst case scenario.
Second, the American Home court assumes that an insurance company and the Department of Insurance can track punitive damage
awards so that higher premiums, based on loss experience, can be
assessed. The court assumes that the insurer and the corporation can
determine how much of any given premium increase is attributable to
punitive damage settlements or awards.
Under Department of Insurance mandate, insurers report loss payments in two categories: bodily injury or property damage. There is
no punitive category. In determining rates, insurers record aggregate
experience based on bodily injury payments. Since bodily injury loss
history will reflect increases in medical care coverage, as well as other
inflationary factors, the corporation and insurer may not be able to
determine what part of the bodily injury payments are for punitive
damages. Alternatively, aggregate bodily injury payments may not go
up because other components are less in a particular year, effectively
masking the punitive damage payments. Thus, the punishment and
deterrence message may be lost, and no change in corporate behavior
will likely be forthcoming if the punitive damage award is insured.
The corporation (or its directors) may simply shrug off responsibility to the stockholders by blaming a premium increase on the many
factors that cause bodily injury payments to rise. Likewise, the deterrence function of punitive damages may be defeated because no
change in the behavior would be accomplished.
193. 743 S.W.2d at 704.
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On the other hand, this is not the case when a separate check must
be written by the corporation to pay a punitive damage award.
Clearly, the responsibility for the act and its consequences are driven
home to corporate officials and stockholders when the corporation
pays the award. Most likely, upper management would become involved in the payment of a sizable punitive award, and could therefore
demand an explanation of the tortious conduct. Where there is no
coverage for punitive damages, the pressure to actively change behavior to avoid a punitive damage award is fully realized. Thus, American
Home's attempt to salvage punishment and deterrence goals, while
allowing insurance coverage of punitive damages, was unconvincing.
In light of the tort reform amendments concerning exemplary damages, the subsequent decision in Moriel, and a faulty economic analysis, the American Home opinion no longer appears valid.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Insuring punitive damages is against public policy in Texas as the
policy has developed in recent years. By the time it was approved and
adopted by the judiciary in Texas, the doctrine of punitive damages
had evolved with the primary goal of punishment. The compensation
purpose, although mentioned in the early cases, was never an independent justification for awarding punitive damages. Adding compensation to the litany of reasons cited for why punitive damages were
assessed did not present a real conflict. Whether viewed as punishment or compensation, each had the salutary effect of fulfilling the
other. But the two purposes came into direct conflict when purchasing liability insurance coverage became a standard business practice.
The effectiveness of the stated justifications for punitive damages
(punishment, deterrence, and example) is severely undermined when
punitive damages are insurable. If punitive damages are not awarded
for the above stated reasons, the only reasons remaining today are
whether the compensation rationale survives, and if rationale for such
an award is compensation. Thus, the issue today is whether the compensation rationale survives, and if so, whether the rationale is an independent justification for punitive damages.
Modern cases that rely on early English common law for the origin
and purpose of punitive damage awards ignore the evolution of the
doctrine. Although some early cases included a compensation purpose to support a punitive damage award, today the primary emphasis
supporting such an award is punishment. The evolution of this theory
of punishment may have occurred because judges recognize the inconsistency of giving different monetary awards as compensation to plaintiffs who had sustained virtually identical damages. But the reason for
different awards is clearly justified when punishment is the purpose of
the award.
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In the United States, the only jurisdictions which allow insurance to
cover punitive damages do not require actual subjective awareness of
the wrong. Without this requirement, the focus is on the defendant's
conduct. This is the same standard as an action for ordinary negligence. Texas originally fell into this category, and therefore no subjective awareness of the wrong was required to award punitive damages.
However, the addition of Chapter 41, Exemplary Damages, to the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code has changed the analysis.
Today, Texas requires actual knowledge or actual conscious indifference before punitive damages are available. The only apparent reason for this addition is to determine which defendants will be
punished. This adds Texas to the list of states that do not allow insurance for punitive damages.
Graham v. Roder, an early Texas case, justified punitive damages as
punishment. Later, Cole v. Tucker had the effect of justifying punitive
damages as compensation, but this was implicitly denied in Flanagan
v. Womack. The independent status of the compensation rationale
was not again addressed until Hofer v. Lavender. The Hofer court did
not justify its extension of compensation as a rationale to support punitive damages. As authority, the Hofer court relied in part on Cole,
but ignored Flanagan. Furthermore, other cases cited by Hofer mention compensation, but they do not define compensation's relationship
to the punishment purpose. Thus, Hofer had no basis to conclude
compensation is an independent purpose of punitive damages.
Hofer, like other cases, confused the "why" and the "what" of punitive damages. Why do punitive damages exist? They are levied for the
purpose of punishment. If punitive damages are awarded for compensation, the question is "why does this plaintiff recover more than other
plaintiffs harmed by ordinary negligence?" This question cannot be
answered without reference to punishment. Likewise, what is the
measure of punitive damages? The measure of punitive damages is
anything the plaintiff presents to the jury, including his remote losses.
Despite the Hofer court's confusion, related cases reveal that compensation is not an independent justification for punitive damages. In
vicarious liability claims against corporations and municipalities, compensation takes a subordinate role. The purpose of limiting the respondeat superior doctrine was driven by an overriding concern to
punish the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff. Thus,
case law does not support an independent compensation rationale that
would justify insuring punitive damages.
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel is the Texas Supreme
Court's latest pronouncement on punitive damages. The requirement
of actual conscious indifference in gross negligence cases follows the
Moriel court's stated purpose of punitive damages: punishment. In
fact, the majority's opinion fails to even mention compensation.
Taken together, Chapter 41, Exemplary Damages and Moriel set the
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stage for overturning recent appellate court decisions allowing insurance for punitive damages.
Joe McKay
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